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AN OBJECTION TO SWINBURNE'S 
ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
In various places Richard Swinburne has presented and defended an 
argument for Cartesian dualism.! His argument has been discussed 
extensively in the literature, and he has recently offered a defense of it 
against several of the published objections. 2 But we think that 
Swinburne's argument invites an objection that has not yet been raised 
in the literature and is fatal to the argumenU 
Swinburne's argument was originally designed to prove the conclu-
sion 'I have a soul in 1984', and we will leave it in that form to begin 
with. It uses four abbreviations: 
p = 'I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984' 
q = 'My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984' 
r = 'I have a soul in 1984' 
s = 'I exist in 1985'. 
Let the variable x range over all consistent propositions that (a) are com-
patible with the conjunction of p and q and that (b) describe only 1984 
states of affairs: Swinburne then offers these three premisses: 
l.p 
2. (x) 0 (p & q & x & s) 
3. -0 (p & q & -r & s) 
From premisses 2 and 3, Swinburne says, it follows that -r is not within 
the range of x. But, since -r does describe only 1984 states of affairs and 
so satisfies restriction (b) on x, -r must violate restriction (a): -r must be 
incompatible with (p & q). Therefore, (p & q) entails r. "But the addi-
tion to p of q, which describes what happens to my body at the end of 
1984[,] can hardly affect whether or not p entails r./I And so, Swinburne 
concludes, "p by itself entails r. Hence, from Premiss 1, r/l5-i.e., that I 
am a conscious person existing in 1984 entails that I have a soul in 1984. 
No argument for one's having a soul could look more elegant. 
Many of the objections that have been raised against this argument 
have been fairly sophisticated complaints against premiss 2, claiming, for 
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instance, that Swinburne equivocates between de re and de dicto readings 
of the premiss, a charge he vehemently denies. But we think premiss 2 
presents a more fundamental problem that hasn't yet been recognized. 
In the case presented by Swinburne's argument, a person who is con-
scious in 1984 has his body totally destroyed at the last instant of 1984 
and nonetheless survives into 1985.6 Now according to Swinburne, 
"Premiss 2 says that it is possible that [s] I survive into 1985, given that 
[p] I am conscious in 1984, even if [q] my body is totally destroyed [in 
the last instant of 1984] and [x] whatever else might be the case in 1984, 
compatible with these last two suppositions."7 
But is that possible? Consider, for instance, this substitution for x: 
xl = 'God destroys my soul at the last instant of 1984'.~ 
xl certainly appears to meet the restrictions on x: (b) it describes only a 
1984 state of affairs, and (a) it is compatible with (p & q). But, contrary 
to premiss 2, it is not possible that p and q and s and xl. And so it looks 
as if the introduction of xl constitutes a counter-example to premiss 2. 
Furthermore, xl is by no means unique.9 Any of the following exam-
ples, among others, would have the same result: 
x2 = 'I cease to exist at the last instant of 1984' 
x3 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of my existence' 
x4 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of time'. 
Consequently, premiss 2 looks false. 
It might at first glance seem easy to protect premiss 2 against this sort 
of counter-example. xl (like our other examples of substitutions for x 
that falsify the premiss) is compatible with (p & q) but not with s. So 
someone might suppose that the problem we're introducing could be 
easily solved by adding a third restriction on x: that (c) any substitution 
for x must also be compatible with s. Then, it seems, all our destructive 
substitutions for x will be ruled out, and premiss 2 will have been pro-
tected against our kind of counter-example. 
However, introducing restriction (c) renders Swinburne's argument 
invalid. With restriction (c) in force, when we recognize that -r isn't in 
the range of x, that will be because -r is incompatible with the conjunc-
tion of the three propositions p and q and s. So in that case it won't follow 
that -r is incompatible with just (p & q), and so it won't be the case that 
(p & q) entails r. 
Consequently, either the argument is unsound because premiss 2 is 
false, or the argument is invalid. 
Furthermore, although the argument's validity could be salvaged by 
reformulating it so that it maintains that -r is incompatible with (p & q & 
s), the reformulation would render the argument useless for 
Swinburne's purposes. A conclusion that p and q and s entail r, or that a 
world in which p, q, and s are all true is also a world in which r is true,lIl 
would come as no news to philosophical readers, whether or not they 
would accept it. An argument to that conclusion would be an argument 
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for dualism that couldn't, or shouldn't, produce a qualm in even a very 
nervous materialist. 
In correspondence with us Swinburne has responded to our objection 
by denying that xl (or any proposition relevantly like it) meets his 
restrictions on substitutions for x: "Any proposition which affirms that 
something existed throughout 1984 and then ceased to exist, which is 
entailed by [your] ... [x2] and ... [x3], clearly involves an entailment about 
a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then. So [x2] and [x3] 
are ruled out as fillings for X."ll And, of course, something similar can 
be said about xl: it, too, entails a hard fact about 1985. As for x4, 
Swinburne denies that it is logically possible for time to end, and so he 
takes x4 to be ruled out by his restricting substitutions for x to consistent 
propositions. 
Not everyone would agree, of course, that it is logically impossible for 
time to end. Without a convincing argument to support this strong claim 
of his, premiss 2 is left vulnerable to a counter-example founded on x4. 
But because we don't want to discuss Swinburne's view about the neces-
sity of endless time, we're going to leave x4 out of consideration. 
But what about Swinburne's reason for rejecting x2 and x3 (and xl) as 
substitutions for x? He claims that these substitutions are ruled out by 
his original restrictions because each of them "involves an entailment 
about a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then" -i.e., that 
there is no such thing as me in 1985. So his defense against our counter-
example amounts to this claim: 
(RS) Any proposition that involves an entailment about a hard 
fact in 1985 violates restriction (b) on substitutions for x, that 
they describe only 1984 states of affairs. 
The fact that Swinburne is committed to this claim helps explain why 
the sort of objection we're raising against premiss 2 didn't worry him as 
he was formulating his argument. All our counter-examples to premiss 
2 are substitutions for x that are compatible with p and q but not with s. 
As we've said, such counter-examples might be warded off by adding 
restriction (c), that substitutions for x must be compatible also with s, 
but that move would vitiate the argument. If, however, claim (RS) is 
true, then restriction (c), which can't be added without vitiating the 
argument, is already in effect in restriction (b), that substitutions for x 
must describe only 1984 states of affairs. Any proposition that is incom-
patible with s must either describe 1985 states of affairs or entail a 
proposition that itself describes 1985 states of affairs, and all such propo-
sitions are ruled out by (RS). Part of the ingenuity of Swinburne's argu-
ment, then, consists precisely in his having intended restriction (b) in 
that way, which allows him to claim that premiss 2 is true without hav-
ing expressly to admit the possibility that -r is not within the range of x 
just in virtue of -r's being incompatible with s. 
But is claim (RS) true? Look again at xl: 'God destroys my soul at the 
last instant of 1984'. As we've said, it certainly appears to satisfy restric-
tion (b). Swinburne, however, denies that any proposition such as xl 
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describes only 1984 states of affairs because, he says, it "involves an 
entailment about a hard fact in 1985", namely, that there is no such thing 
as me then. 
It might be objected that if Swinburne is right about that entailment, 
then a claim about my death entails that there is time after my death, 
which seems absurd. But of course if, as Swinburne supposes, the per-
sistence of time is logically necessary, this objection would be empty; 
and so we won't pursue it here. 
Well, then, what about Swinburne's idea that any proposition that 
entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985 can't be only 
about 1984? We're inclined to think that this is a mistaken way of think-
ing about what it is for a proposition to be about some particular time 
only. It seems to many people that if Fl, a fact about tl, depends on F2, 
some fact that obtains at t2, a later time, then a proposition describing Fl 
is not about t1 only. But it is not clearly the case that Fl depends on F2 
whenever Fl's obtaining at tl entails that some contingent F2 obtains at 
t2.12 We think, however, that we don't need to argue with Swinburne 
over the general point about what it is for a proposition to be about 
some particular time only. For it seems to us that Swinburne can apply 
claim (RS) to defend premiss 2 as he does only at the cost of invalidating 
his argument. 
Swinburne's argument maintains that -r (= 'It is not the case that I have 
a soul in 1984') is not within the range of x. And the crux of his argument 
consists in his saying that since -r clearly does satisfy restriction (b), 
describing only 1984 states of affairs, it's because of its violation of restric-
tion (a)-its being incompatible with (p & q)-that -r isn't in the range of x. 
So, given Swinburne's commitment to claim (RS), his argument requires 
him to say that -r involves no entailment about a hard fact in 1985.11 
Unfortunately for Swinburne's argument, however, -r entails just the 
sort of fact about the post-1984 future that Swinburne himself gives as 
an example of an entailed hard fact about that future-"viz., that there is 
no such thing then"-since 'It is not the case that I have a soul in 1984' 
entails that there is no such thing as my soul in 1985. In the context of 
Swinburne's argument, the 'I' of -r is of course identical with the 'I' of p 
('I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984'). We also assume here that 
if something has a soul, it necessarily has a soul; but this assumption, or 
one relevantly like it, must underlie Swinburne's argument as well. 
Otherwise, God could give me a soul at the very instant at which my 
body is totally destroyed, and I could thus exist into 1985 even if my 
body is destroyed at the last instant of 1984 and I lacked a soul before 
then-in which case premiss 3 would be false. 
Furthermore, even if we replaced the pronoun in -r and recast the 
argument using a proper name-e.g., 'Richard'-it would still be the 
case that -r entails a hard fact about the future. We think that 'It is not 
the case that Richard has a soul in 1984' entails 
(D) Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or 
(ii) in 1985 God causes Richard's soul to come into existence and 
to exist for some time, however short. 
SWINBURNE'S ARGUMENT FOR DUALiSM 409 
But for those who, unlike us, suppose that God is contingent and that 
souls can just pop into existence without being created, (D) can be 
rephrased as (0'): 
(0') Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or 
(ii) in 1985 Richard's soul begins to exist and exists for some 
time, however short. 
Neither (D) nor (0') is a necessary truth, since there are worlds (includ-
ing the actual world, as Swinburne sees it) in which Richard has a soul 
in 1985, but it does not come into existence in 1985. Moreover, both dis-
juncts of both (D) and (0') describe 1985 states of affairs. Given 
Swinburne's view that -r is about 1984 only, he must also suppose that 
disjunct (i) of both (D) and (0') describes a hard fact about 1985. And, 
because we deny (RS), we can maintain that disjunct (i) describes a hard 
fact even if we also hold that -r (and propositions relevantly like it) 
entail propositions describing contingent facts about the future. Finally, 
it seems to us that both (Dii) and (D'ii) describe hard facts about 1985. 
Consequently, whether we suppose that -r entails (D) or only (0'), -r 
entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985. So, if (RS) is 
true, then, because -r entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 
1985, -r is not only about 1984 states of affairs-contrary to Swinburne's 
claim. 
In conversation, Swinburne has objected to this argument on the fol-
lowing grounds. First, on his view, God is contingent, and souls can 
pop into existence without being created, and so -r doesn't entail (D). 
Second, although he doesn't deny that -r entails (0'), he does deny 
that (0') describes a hard fact, because of the nature of (D'ii). On 
Swinburne's view, (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. Let the 
moment at which Richard's soul comes into existence be t. Then (D'ii) 
entails that immediately before t that person's soul did not exist. Now on 
Swinburne's view any fact about a time t is a soft fact if it entails a hard 
fact about any other time, whether earlier or later than t. His view there-
fore stipulates very stringent requirements for the status of hard fact, 
since a fact about t will be a soft fact not only if it entails that some fact 
about the future obtains, but even if it entails a fact about any time 
before t. Standard examples used to illustrate hard facts will not count 
as hard facts in line with these requirements-e.g., Jones wakes up at 8 
a.m., which entails that before 8 a.m. Jones exists; Caesar dies at t1 on the 
steps of the Capitol, which entails that before tl Caesar is alive; the sun rises 
in the east at tl; which entails that before tl the sun does not have the position 
in the sky it has at tl. Consequently, Swinburne's requirements for the 
status of hard fact strike us as very implausible. For that reason we 
reject his claim that (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. And so, even 
if we recast Swinburne's argument, replacing the pronoun with a proper 
name, and even if we accept his views that God is contingent and that 
souls can come into existence without being created by God, on our 
view it is nonetheless true that -r entails a hard fact about the future-the 
one described by (0'). 
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Therefore, if Swinburne is rjght in supposing that no proposition that 
entails a hard fact about 1985 is a proposition that satisfies restriction (b), 
describing only 1984 states of affairs, then -r's not being within the range 
of x is sufficiently explained just by its violating restriction (b): -r isn't 
about 1984 states of affairs only. In that case, it doesn't follow from pre-
misses 1-3 that -r is incompatible with (p & q). And in that case 
Swinburne's argument is, again, invalid. 
Therefore, viewed from more than one angle, either Swinburne's 
argument for dualism is unsound because premiss 2 is false, or it is 
invalid. 
It is important to us to conclude by emphasizing the obvious: our 
arguments against Swinburne's argument don't constitute or even con-
tribute to an argument against dualism generally; there may, of course, 
be other, perfectly acceptable arguments for dualism. What's more, 
Swinburne is arguing for a Cartesian sort of dualism; but that isn't the 
only sort that has been important in philosophy. Aquinas, for instance, 
developed a very different, non-Cartesian form of substance dualism. I I 
We're inclined to think that Aquinas's version is untouched by the sorts 
of objections we raise against Swinburne's argument and also avoids the 
standard objections to Cartesian dualism in the literature. Is 
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